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ARTICLE
RISKS OF ASSUMPTIONS: IMPACTS OF




When should the manufacturer of an industrial chemical product such as
a paint, solvent, or complex mixture be liable in tort to an injured worker for
failure of the product label to warn of the chemical's health related risks?
The answer to that modest question has become more volatile than paint,
more explosive than some solvents, and as complex as many chemical mix-
tures. Recently, the imposition of federal chemical safety, training, and la-
beling requirements has further clouded the picture. This Article addresses
the long-term consequences of that federal activity upon the parallel tort.law
system of industrial products liability.
The RAND Corporation and other federal and private studies have docu-
mented the increase of products liability litigation.' Conventional consumer
use of products liability litigation has grown even as reform legislation de-
bates continue. The use of liability principles in industry workplace settings,
however, has most often involved capital equipment, such as presses and
bulldozers, rather than chemical products.' Workers' compensation cover-
age has lessened workers' urgency to pursue third-party tort actions against
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; corporate prac-
tice, Cincinnati, Ohio; B.A. 1969 Boston College, J.D. 1974, University of Virginia. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Becky Brown of the Class of 1988,
University of Cincinnati College of Law.
1. M. PETERSON, S. SARMA, M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FIND-
INGS (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1987); see also, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 2 (1986)
[hereinafter TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP REPORT].
2. Machinery injury cases, such as Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw Inc., 630 F.2d 616 (8th Cir.
1980), are far more common than chemical injury cases such as Ward v. Desachem Co., 771
F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1985), and Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
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capital equipment manufacturers except in serious cases where the employee
sustained acute physical injuries.
While the effects of worker's compensation may have restrained the
worker-plaintiff's use of tort remedies in the past,3 this is changing in the
segment of industry manufacturing chemicals and chemical-derived prod-
ucts. Although the change may be too recent for scholars to notice it, the
insurance industry has recognized it in the insurance rates for many produ-
cers of industrial products.4 Thus, litigation between manufacturers and the
employees or former employees of distant customers increasingly addresses
the long-term illness situations formerly handled by disability or workers'
compensation coverage.
Chronic illness cases alleging industrial products liability will increase
geometrically for at least three reasons. First, asbestos litigation has trained
many plaintiffs' lawyers to consider industrial exposure patterns as a causal
factor in chronic illnesses.5 Second, significant liability judgments awarded
3. M. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 15 (1987), exhaustively treats the
interaction of workers' compensation with the tort system. Part of the difficulty has been the
reluctance of workers' compensation systems to treat as a compensable "accident" a condition
that develops over a number of years as a result of exposure. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS 575 (5th ed. 1984). See generally Note, Workmen's Compensation: The
Cumulative Injury Doctrine, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 435 (1981).
4. Priest, Modern Tort Law and the Current Insurability Crisis (Yale Law School Civic
Liability Program Working Paper No. 44, 1986), abstracted at 24 Hous. L. REV. 65 (1987),
best reviews this issue.
5. Industrial liability cases attracting the most intense debate in the past decade allege
that manufacturers knew that fibers emitted from structural insulation installed in ships or
structures caused asbestosis. See generally J. ARTABANE & C. BAUMER, DEFUSING THE As-
BESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (1986). How-
ever, asbestosis fails as a metaphor for the typical chemical exposure case addressed in this
Article because its causation is more clear than that of internal organ cancers or reproductive
problems allegedly related to chemical exposure. See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning
Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (4th Cir. 1986); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 194, 447 A.2d 539, 543 (1982). Asbestos manufacturers' alleged
knowledge of asbestosis causation raises an evidentiary issue shown to strongly affect the trial
jury. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081. Asbestos litigation frequently asks: "What did they know
and when did they know it?" Id. Asbestos cases have had a major impact upon civil litigation
practice. See, e.g., M. SELVIN & L. PINCUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OB-
SERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE 12 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1987).
The questions of causation, research, statistical incidence, and epidemiology in the typical
chemical exposure case differ significantly. The unpredictability of disease causation causes
this trouble. CAUSATION AND FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR CLAIMS OF PERSONAL IN-
JURY FROM TOXIC CHEMICAL EXPOSURE 14-18 (L. Novey ed. 1986) (Georgetown Univ. Med.
Ctr. Inst. Health Policy Analysis, Conference Proceedings) [hereinafter L. Novey]. The rarity
of the particular exposure effect aids in proving neurological damage from workplace chemical
exposure, however. The rarity of the effect and the fact that it occurs more frequently among
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by courts in recent years have encouraged the filing of liability actions.6
Third, publicity about toxic tort cases has led to a revolution in information
flow, 7 leading in turn to a revelation of risk information and prompting in-
creased litigation. Federal regulatory intervention in the realm of workplace
information will produce additional claims as long-term users of unlabeled
chemicals learn of harmful exposures.
The current approach to handling industrial employee illness and accident
tort cases disdains the use of assumption of the risk defenses because physi-
cal injuries from capital equipment rarely involve fair opportunities for real
choice of risk-avoidance conduct by individual workers. This Article sug-
gests that personal injury due to chemical exposure is increasingly avoidable
as federally mandated dissemination of information to employees begins to
provide increased opportunities for workers, individually or collectively, to
avoid chemical safety risks. Increased awareness of risks and use of assump-
tion of the risk defenses will make tort law relatively obsolete in future in-
dustrial toxic illness cases.
I. TORT LAW ISSUES
A. The Tort Deterrence Principle
Prior to the strict liability revolution in product warning litigation, the
tort law system did not deter significantly the distribution of hazardous
products by chemical manufacturers. Disability or workers' compensation
programs compensated for most chronic diseases allegedly resulting from
chemical exposures providing manufacturers of those products little tort law
incentive to provide adequate warning labels.8 The only external forces
upon the chemical manufacturer who chose to develop a product label were
customers' desires, the need to provide consumers with enough information
to ensure effective product use, shareholders' need for returns on invest-
ments through improved sales, and a desire to keep pace with customary
warnings provided by competitors. Thus, the adequacy of chemical warn-
ings depended upon employer education and safety practices which may not
have been sufficient to safeguard workers from risk.
Today, failure to provide adequate warning against unreasonable danger
exposed workers than among others, eases admission of epidemiology and supportive testi-
mony. See Grenier v. Dow Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 1529, 1531 (D. Me. 1986).
6. See generally Brief for Insurance Company of North America, Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) (No. 81-198) (petition for writ of
certiorari).
7. See L. Novey, supra note 5, at 14-18.
8. These no-fault compensation systems and the availability of a safety net of disability
payments have lessened the pressure for a compensation system.
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may result in strict liability for manufacturers of industrial, noncapital
goods.9 As a result, the insurer's desire to avoid product liability exposure
has added an important external factor to labeling decisions by chemical
manufacturers.' ° Tort law has delivered a significant benefit to industry
workers by forcing producers of chemical products to become more warning
conscious, thereby making products putatively safer.
At one time, avoidance of strict liability dominated the consideration of a
manufacturer faced with a warning label decision. However, strict liability
is no longer the key determinant. Systematic penalties of a national regula-
tory system accomplish deterrence, supplanting the former logic of deter-
rence in the law of torts. Congress and administrative agencies promote
safety in ways that make it less necessary for the tort process to assure safe
workplaces. "
Tort law continues to serve other values such as compensation for unin-
sured injuries. However, even the compensation value of tort law has dimin-
ished significantly because industrial or governmental insurance programs
frequently compensate for workplace injuries. Thus, the recent federal de-
velopments replace the common law deterrent with a federal standard of
care, a federalized' 2 rationale for action, and a new assumption of risk de-
fense premised upon the federal requirements.
13
B. Strict Liability and Its "Unreasonableness" Requirement
The manufacturer's obligation to communicate risk information to users
remains a constant in tort law, even as theories change and evolve. A
worker alleging that a chemical product manufacturer caused harm through
workplace chemical exposure has available three principal causes of action:
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty.1'
9. See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
10. This factor has received increased attention from chemical products manufacturers as
liability continues to increase and insurability continues to decrease in the mid-1980's. See
TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 1.
11. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT
AND PROCESS INJURIES 15 (1987) (draft progress report) [hereinafter ALt REPORT].
12. The term "federalized" does not require statutory preemption, for such preemption is
a relatively rare effect of regulation as the Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984),
decision suggests. Rather, it is the pragmatic persuasiveness that nontort stimuli have more
efficiently accomplished what a lawsuit would have done in the past that has preempted the
field.
13. The comprehensive federal response has had at least these impacts. We eventually
will see the full impact on both worker torts and workers' compensation claims, though it is
too early for empirical data at this time.
14. See generally Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (discussing the
[Vol. 37:85
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Traditional doctrines of tort recovery focused on negligent conduct of the
person responsible for labeling the chemical's container. Negligence looks to
a duty to warn, breach of that duty, proximate cause, and injury. 5 This
traditional action offers limited relief to the worker who develops a chronic
disease after a long latency period.' 6 Additionally, complex relationships
between exposure levels and incidences of illness make it difficult to prove a
specific breach of duty.' 7
Warranty actions assert the existence of an explicit or implied obligation
to deliver cautionary information to the contracting customer.'" The third
party nonpurchaser, such as the factory worker who has no economic rela-
tionship with the chemical manufacturer, rarely asserts a warranty claim.
Preconditions to assertion of an implied warranty may prove
insurmountable. 19
Although a relatively new theory in tort law, strict liability dominates
chemical products liability actions today.2° Elements in a strict liability ac-
tion include proximate cause, defect, an "unreasonably dangerous" condi-
tion of the product, and evidence that the dangerous condition existed when
the product left the manufacturer's plant.2 ' Advocates often most bitterly
contest whether the product's claimed deficiency of design or warning was
"unreasonably dangerous."'22
For instance, in a suit by a worker burned by developing chemical assume
that the chemical supplier conceded inclusion of a powerful acid in a devel-
oping solution and use of a warning covering some, but not all, potential
three alternative systems as they coexist today). For historical reasons, their interrelationship
in modern tort theory is not entirely satisfactory. For an overview of the systems, see J.
O'REILLY, PRODUCT DEFECTS AND HAZARDS: LITIGATION AND REGULATORY STRATEGIES
ch. 2 (1987).
15. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3.
16. This question has arisen where a party asserts a statute of limitations defense. See
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1220 n.13 (6th Cir. 1980).
17. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 1:68 (1987) [hereinafter ALPL 3D].
18. See J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.23 (1983).
19. Id.
20. See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) (the theory of strict liability dominates the products liability field as
a whole).
21. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
22. The term of art "unreasonably dangerous" most often appears in cases arising under
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See, e.g., Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654
F.2d 1337, 1343-45 (9th Cir. 1981). It remains a hotly debated, hard to define term, especially
in warnings cases. See, e.g., Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation and Justice: A Jurisdictional
Analysis of the Concept of Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect, 28 S.C.L. REV. 587, 604-21
(1977); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISs. L.J. 825, 832-33
(1973). See generally J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DAN-
GEROUS REQUIREMENT (1981).
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harms of the solution.23 In most states, workers' compensation bars a suit
against the employer even if exposure occurred under unusual working con-
ditions. If the employee sues the chemical supplier, he must establish the
element of "unreasonableness" of the warnings. Unreasonableness is mea-
sured by several key factors: the incidence of harm, the likelihood of the
occurrence of harm, the severity of the injury likely to occur, and the fore-
seeability of injury. 24 The worker establishes these points to prove that the
chemical mixture was "defective" because of its inadequate warnings and/or
its unreasonably dangerous design features for workers handling the
mixture.25
Although an entire jurisprudence of strict liability has developed around
three categories of "defects"-design, warnings, and manufacturing-courts
analyze the strict liability "warning defect" cases in a manner much like the
analysis of duty in negligence cases. 26 The standard applied considers fore-
seeability and duty.27 The courts examine the choices involved in making
the label decision, although a conduct-oriented evaluation is inappropriate in
"pure" strict liability. 28 Thus, deficient warning litigation weighs more of
the subjective manufacturer choice matters than the typical "design defect"
case considers.29
C. How Tort Law Defines Standards of Care in Labeling
The context and method of warning is relevant to the standard of care for
product warning labels. Although labeling of chemical products intends to
23. Defendants concede the danger in many strict liability cases. They often contest the
reasonableness of the warning given (if any) concerning that particular danger. Thus, pre-
scription drugs may have side effects known to the manufacturer. The reasonableness of the
manufacturer's failure to warn prescribing physicians of these side effects may then become the
issue. See, e.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 400, 681 P.2d 1038,
1049 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1985); see also Wade, supra note 22, at 845-46.
24. J. O'REILLY, supra note 14, at ch. 6; see also Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d
238, 244-46 (3d Cir. 1984).
25. Parties typically take into account Dean Wade's well articulated criteria and other
factors in their assessment of the unreasonableness standard. See Wade, supra note 22, at 837-
38.
26. See Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 II1. 2d 26, 33-37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 198-99
(1980); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.030(1)(b) (Supp. 1987) (establishing a negligence analysis in warnings cases); J.
O'REILLY, supra note 14, § 6.2.
27. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 552-54, 332 A.2d 11, 20-21 (1975).
28. Woodill, 79 Ill. 2d at 38, 402 N.E.2d at 200 (Moran, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
29. Reasonableness of the product warnings chosen by the manufacturer is the central
theme in "duty to warn" cases. See Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 273
N.W.2d 476 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); 3 ALPL 3D, supra
note 17, § 34:28.
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communicate risk information to the product user, different users receive the
labeling in different contexts depending upon the product form at the time of
delivery. Bulk chemicals move in rail car or tank truck shipments, and their
safety labeling typically takes the form of an accompanying set of standard-
ized documents explaining the chemical's risks.3" Labels of chemicals mov-
ing into the plant by truck shipment often appear on the drums. Most
industrial containers bear labels supplied by the manufacturer. However,
some plants actually use chemicals placed in casually assembled containers
refilled by the individual user, such as a janitor's pint of floor wax taken
from a large drum. 3' In standard practice, the manufacturer labels the drum
to meet its own norms of voluntary industry label standards, while no labels
appear on the more casual workplace containers.
Today, the law of warnings is unsettled. The courts imprecisely define the
standard of care of adequate labeling applicable in negligence actions and in
strict liability "warning defect" cases. Like most legal standards, the stan-
dard of care in workplace labeling has developed primarily through appellate
review of jury instructions in serious injury cases. 32 These trial court in-
structions are premised upon a narrow jury comparison of actual labels in
the worker-plaintiff's location and testimony about industry knowledge and
industry practices.33
Subjective "norms" of labeling thrive in such an unsettled environment,
and, predictably, experts will disagree about the adequacy of a label. 34 For
example, plaintiff's experts typically testify about deficiencies in worker
awareness of risks of a brand-named compound that omitted risk warnings
of the illness the plaintiff contracted. This process results in haphazard and
unsatisfactory liability judgments that undermine effective business plan-
ning. The chemical industry, an area of rapid, competitive change and high
capital costs, demands predictable overhead costs for insurance on products
and facilities.35
30. Bulk shipments pose a problem in warning methods, particularly where the chemical
shipped may have a variety of possible uses. Pennwalt Corp. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App.
3d 923, 925, 218 Cal. Rptr. 675, 677 (1985).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f) (1987) (OSHA requirements for the labeling of workplace
containers).
32. The large size of some awards and the potential precedential effect of the ruling make
appellate review of the jury instructions in these serious injury cases more intense. See, e.g.,
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (4th Cir. 1986).
33. See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8.05[3]A (1986).
34. A new text book dealing with the law of warnings discusses an illustration of the
testing that goes into the expert process. See W. VISCUSI & W. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT
RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION app. (1987).
35. To a certain extent, chemical industry insurance problems result from uncertainties
about products liability exposure. The exposure to products liability verdicts has increased
1987]
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D. Intersection of Tort and Regulatory Warning Incentives
Regulations and product liability concerns interact to stimulate safety ef-
forts in areas other than the workplace. Outside of the workplace contexts
discussed above, a plaintiff injured in a nonworkplace setting looks to retail
or transporter practices for a tort standard of care, and to the federal stan-
dards of transport labeling or of consumer product warning labels. Federal
systems of transport and consumer product warning, in place for decades,
afford a basis for comparison more objective than that of the "battle of ex-
perts" in a typical tort action.3 6
The objective regulatory standard serves as a minimum, rather than a
maximum, level of compliance.37 Although defendants have attempted to
equate regulatory compliance with satisfaction of a tort standard of care, a
few controversial cases such as Ferrebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. " and
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. " have rejected such efforts.
Jury-oriented tort law typically looks to the jury for a decision on "ade-
quacy" of label warnings. Hence, tort law hesitates to accept dictation of the
duty of care by government regulators. However, when courts do accept
federal standards as some evidence of due care, the standards typically help
to determine the adequacy of the warning.'
Use of a federal standard as a minimum duty of care in a tort action may
help the manufacturer-defendant, but it does not assure nonliability.4 1 Fed-
eral standards can cut against a defendant who clearly violates them. The
worker-plaintiff then becomes an enforcer of the standard by asserting that
significantly in recent years. Long, Product Liability Suits.: Growing Concern to Chemical
Firms, 65 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, April 27, 1987, at 19.
36. Hazardous materials transportation legislation dates back to the early 1970's, but the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1813 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) implemented the first potent
control system. The Federal Hazardous Substances Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat.
372 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982)), was the first major consumer
product labeling law, modeled in part upon the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982), which dates back to the Food and Drug Act of June 3, 1906, ch.
3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040,
1059.
37. Federal standards usually set a minimum duty, but compliance evidence can help.
See, e.g., Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129, 132-34 (8th Cir. 1985). As to
Occupational Safety and Health Administration compliance as evidence of care, see Loznicka
v. Flexitallic Gasket Co., 489 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
38. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
39. 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
40. See 3 ALPL 3D, supra note 17, § 34:34.
41. In Ferrebee, compliance with a mandatory label requirement met a minimum duty of




inadequacy of the label constitutes negligence per se.42 While these theories
establish liability from violation of the law or regulation itself, they do not
prove breach of a duty to an individual user.4 3 Thus, in cases with vague
standards, a plaintiff might find it easier to prove negligent label design than
to prove a clear violation of vague federal labeling standards. Before federal
requirements for workplace hazard communication went into effect in
1986, 44 the utility of labeling regulations for offensive or defensive use was
uncertain.
E. Defenses
When a worker challenges the label of a workplace chemical as giving
inadequate warning, the challenge implicitly asserts that the manufacturer
deprived the worker of a means of self-protection. The key defenses in in-
dustrial products liability cases include lack of proof of causation, interven-
ing causation defeating the proximate cause assertion, and assumption of
risk.4 5
Causation is often difficult to prove in chronic disease cases where a
worker asserts that chemical exposure resulted in cancer, reproductive
problems, or serious disease.4 6 The manufacturer can assert plausible, alter-
native medical causation arguments in most cases. For example, establish-
ing the smoking habits of a chemical handling worker-plaintiff who later
developed a lung condition undermines causation.4 7 The scientific contro-
versies played out in tort trials include the effects of natural carcinogens, the
impact of lifestyle factors such as diet and smoking, and the predeliction or
heredity factors in development of some cancers.4 8
When debating causation, the worker-plaintiff asserts that illness would
42. To use a violation of an OSHA rule as negligence per se in a tort action, the plaintiff
first must show an independent cause of action "established by either state or federal law
which establishes the right of an employee to be free from negligence, the duty of the employer
to take reasonable precautions, and the liability of the employer for injuries caused by the
failure to take reasonable precautions." Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 265
(lst Cir. 1985).
43. Labels for drugs and other closely regulated products could be subject to such eager
policing of the regulatory norms. See O'Reilly, Deregulation and Private Causes of Action:
Second Bites of the Apple, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 238 (1987); Walsh & Klein, The
Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 171 (1986).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987); see also infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
45. J. O'REILLY, supra note 14, §§ 8.3, 7.5, 7.7.
46. L. Novey, supra note 5, at 101; see also Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d
602, 606 (Tex. 1972); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); 3 ALPL 3D, supra
note 17, § 34:32.
47. L. Novey, supra note 5, at 101, 117.
48. Cancer causation is probably the most frequently disputed issue. Id. at 29-33.
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not have occurred if warnings had appeared on containers because the
worker would have implemented self-protection.49 The defense to such an
allegation raises alternative causation issues and argues that exposure levels
to particular workplace chemicals vary with factors such as methods of use,
ventilation, purity of the chemical, and percentage of the mixture comprising
the toxic material."0 The proximate causation of the injury by the omissions
of warnings from the label poses a debate over the permissibility of alterna-
tive inferences. 5
Many industrial tort cases involve the conduct of an employer who is not
a defendant because of workers' compensation barriers. A defense may be
raised that the manufacturer tried to send information to the workers, but
the employer failed to deliver it.52 If the intervening cause defense works,
and the forum state does not require apportionment of liability in tort
cases,53 the worker will collect no more than his or her workers' compensa-
tion payments for that disabling illness." 4 Cases that assert the chronic-dis-
ease inadequacies of workers compensation systems may resolve debate over
whether to allow actions for intentional torts, beyond workers'
compensation.55
Assumption of risk defenses by manufacturers typically have not suc-
ceeded. Workers benefit from tort law's presumption that if a product had
been adequately labeled, the worker would have heeded the warning and
prevented injury.5 6 However, even in cases where the manufacturer estab-
49. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); 3 ALPL 3D, supra note 17,
§ 34:32; see also Technical Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d at 606.
50. For example, the manufacturer of a basic chemical may present the alternative causa-
tion assertion that repackaging of the product by an intermediate supplier removed the original
firm's duty. See Nigh v. Dow Chem. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (W.D. Wisc. 1986); see also
R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 98 (1980).
51. J. O'REILLY, supra note 14, §§ 7.5, 7.6; see also Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning
Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1161-64 (4th Cir. 1986); Marder v. G.D. Seale & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087
(D. Md. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Wheelahan v. G.D. Seale & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987).
52. Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1348 (9th Cir. 1981); Hopkins v.
Chip-In-Saw Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 621 (8th Cir. 1980); Martinez v. Dixie Carriers Inc., 529 F.2d
457, 463 (5th Cir. 1976).
53. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 209 (2d ed. 1986).
54. For an example of a state that does require apportionment, see N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. &
R. 1402 (McKinney 1982). State legislation may require the apportionment of liability among
defendants, see, e.g., Forsythe v. Coats Co., 230 Kan. 553, 558, 639 P.2d 43, 46 (1982), or
common law may do so. See, e.g., Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 327, 579 P.2d
441, 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 282
N.E.2d 288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391 (1972).
55. See ALI REPORT, supra note 11, at 17.
56. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); see also, Technical Chem. Co. v.
Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972); Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in
Strict Tort Liability, 1982 DEF. L.J. 267, 307.
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lishes adequate labeling, courts hesitate to penalize workers for their failure
to avoid risks associated with capital equipment, even if the identical defense
would be successful in a consumer suit to recover for exposure to the same
properly labeled product.5 7 Fear of loss of employment and the employee's
duty to comply with the employer's workplace commands intervene when
the manufacturer argues that the worker-plaintiff's improper use assumed
the risk of injury.58
The 1987 case of Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chemical Co. " may indi-
cate a shift in acceptance of the assumption of risk defense in chemical liabil-
ity actions. In Sprankle, the president of the local chemical workers' union
at a chemical plant received written material about the dangers of ammonia
and refused to clean an ammonia tank because "he knew what he was get-
ting in to."" Finding proper for the jury questions regarding adequacy of
the warning and existence of a "probable cause" connection between ammo-
nia warning information deficiencies and plaintiff's injury, the court affirmed
the judgment in favor of the defendant company on both strict liability and
negligence grounds.6 1 In future cases, especially in light of increased infor-
mation flow to workers that results from federal regulation, similar warnings
may bar recovery by workers who assume risks of exposure after receipt of
safety data.
II. FEDERAL STANDARDS
A. The Regulatory System of OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the OSH Act) 62 autho-
rizes federal safety regulators of the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (OSHA) to adopt safety standards to deal with specific chemicals
that pose "significant" health risks.63 Additionally, the OSH Act gives
OSHA broad residual power to enforce certain standards against employers
who breach the general duty to make the workplace free of hazards.64
57. See McCracken v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 103 Ill. App. 3d 26, 29-30, 430
N.E.2d 539, 542 (1982); Coty v. U.S. Slicing Machine Co., 58 11. App. 3d 237, 245-46, 373
N.E.2d 1371, 1377-78 (1978).
58. See McCracken, 103 Il. App. 3d at 26, 430 N.E.2d at 539; Reed v. Pennwalt Corp.,
22 Wash. App. 748, 751, 591 P.2d 478, 481 (1979); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426,
433, 581 P.2d 271, 278 (1978).
59. 824 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 412.
61. Id. at 414, 416.
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-675 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
63. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 615
(1980) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
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A chemical plant must meet both requirements in the typical course of
production: it must conform to the "general duty" clause by keeping the
workplace safe; and it must monitor for lead, benzene, and other specifically
regulated chemicals under a specific regulatory standard .6' The former in-
volves general safety measures protecting workers from excessive accumula-
tion of noxious fumes,66 while the latter allows workers to understand the
potential problems that would be created if workplace air became laden with
a dust or an airborne contaminant at a level greater than the maximum
OSHA deems to be safe. 67 For example, OSHA subjected benzene, a petro-
leum-based chemical widely used in the American workplace, to a
mandatory workplace safety standard after extensive litigation.68 The
United States Supreme Court and lower appellate courts69 have interpreted
frequently the power of OSHA to set standards for specific chemical prod-
ucts. 70 The OSHA standards on lead, benzene, and cotton dust have
presented the federal courts with interesting issues of scientific proof and
regulatory procedure.71
Typically, an OSHA standard requires application of certain protective
controls to the handling and use of the standard's named toxic chemicals.
For example, OSHA may require application of a label with a prescribed
warning to the containers of a specific chemical in the workplace,72 regular
monitoring for workplace exposure to determine that exposure does not ex-
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1910(Z) (1987). In 1987, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) finally issued its standard for benzene. See 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460 (1987).
66. See United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v. General
Dynamics, 815 F.2d 1570, 1573 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress adopted these specific standards
under 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7), which encourages labeling and other forms of communication of
risks to the employees.
67. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. at 627.
68. Id. at 630; see also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981).
69. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, remanded sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,
540 (1981); American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on
other grounds, sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 613 (1980).
70. Hadley & Richman, The Impact of Benzene and Cotton Dust: Restraints on the Regu-
lation of Toxic Substances, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. 59, 70 (1982).
71. Id.; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Rothstein, Substantive and Procedural Obstacles to
OSHA Rulemaking." Reproductive Hazards as an Example, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 627,
694 (1985).
72. The label required by the standard on benezidine for containers in the workplace, for
example, requires display of the words "CANCER SUSPECT AGENT" immediately under




ceed the OSHA threshold level,73 or training and examination of workers
including in some cases health screening of lung functions or blood levels to
lessen the adverse health effects of working with the chemicals. 74 If an em-
ployer monitors workplace or individual health, workers have an absolute
right to see the collected data.75 Complaints to OSHA may result in inspec-
tions, monitoring, and civil penalty fines with abatement orders against the
employer.7 6
Design of the total package of controls in an OSHA standard for a specific
chemical addresses that chemical's probable uses. Communication to work-
ers covers a chemical's use in typical workplaces by taking into considera-
tion use patterns, restrictions, and other relevant factors. Even where a
specific chemical safety standard does not apply to a workplace situation, or
the workplace meets the minimum level standard, the worker may have ad-
ditional protection against inadequate communication of risks. For exam-
ple, in Auto Workers v. General Dynamics, 17 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that if an employer knows
from reasonable experience that a danger exists beyond the terms of the
OSHA standard, the employer must meet the OSH Act's "general duty"
clause as well as the terms of the specific standard. 7' The court's interpreta-
tion of the "general duty" clause as an umbrella as well as a floor on chemi-
cal regulation is clearly significant. Notably, Judge James Buckley, a former
Senator who had been critical of OSHA as a legislator, authored General
Dynamics. 79
Because of the labor-intensive effort that goes into each regulatory stan-
dard, the creation of a workplace standard for exposure to specific chemicals
is only feasible for a narrow set of substances.80 In contrast, the "general
duty" clause covers the wider set of "knowingly" unsafe workplace condi-
tions, which require communication of warnings when the employer has
73. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018(e) (1987) (workplace testing required for inorganic
arsenic).
74. See, e.g., Special Provisions for Workers Exposed to Lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(d),
(j), (1) (1987).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(e)(2) (1987).
76. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 309 (1978).
77. 815 F.2d 1570, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). "Each employer--) shall furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are caus-
ing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees... Id.
79. 815 F.2d at 1571.
80. OSHA spends a tremendous amount of effort on each chemical-specific standard.
Some scholars have criticized this procedural cost. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 180-81 (1982); Rothstein, supra note 71, at 662-63.
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knowledge of the hazardous working condition. 8' "Scienter is the key," the
court emphasized in General Dynamics. 82 That proverb is relevant to the
next level of federal interposition into label warnings-the performance-ori-
ented hazard communication standard, which became effective in May
1986.83
B. The Hazard Communication Standard
OSHA published the hazard communication standard as a final rule in
November 1983, allowing a phase-in period for industrial concerns to
achieve compliance with minimal disruption. 4 A mandatory federal pro-
gram of chemical hazard communication took effect in May 1986 for all
manufacturing establishments regulated by OSHA and its state counter-
parts.85 In 1987, after extensive litigation, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit ordered OSHA to expand the regulatory
requirements to reach all employers.8 6 Thus, the hazard communication
standard now applies, with very limited exceptions, to every OSHA-regu-
lated workplace, whether manufacturing or nonmanufacturing s7
A key aspect of the hazard communication standard is that it is a per-
formance-oriented standard that directs an end result, not a specific set of
words. Under the performance orientation standard, nonexempt employers
must implement labeling and training programs but are free to choose the
method and manner of implementation. The chemical manufacturer-em-
ployer must transmit required information to its employees and to the em-
ployees of "downstream" purchasers. The standard permits employers to
design their own training and labeling programs, utilizing communications
81. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
82. 815 F.2d at 1576.
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987), amended by 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,877 (1987).
Courts generally willingly consider OSHA standards as part of workplace tort actions. See,
e.g., Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners Inc., 672 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1982). However, the
stronger of two competing lines of case precedent absolves a civil tort defendant of "negligence
per se" liability for downstream recipients of its product and other nonemployees of the com-
pany itself. For example, X company may violate an OSHA regulation intended to protect X's
employees, and if so may be liable for negligence per se if other jurisdictional requirements are
met. However, employees of Y company, a recipient purchaser of X's packaged chemicals,
cannot invoke the negligence per se argument against X because no OSHA "employer" status
applies. See Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,331 (1983). OSHA intended that the phase-in period would allow
sufficient time for the implementation of the standard without maximum costs to the regulated
firms, as the preamble to the regulation explained. Id. OSHA imposed a much briefer period
for the later expanded version of the standard. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,867 (1987).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987).
86. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 739 (3d Cir. 1985).
87. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852 (1987).
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such as employer-designed labels and material safety data sheet design, to
meet the standard.8 Flexibility in the methods chosen for performance,
however, reduces predictability that the warning will forestall liability chal-
lenges asserted against that manufacturer. An ironclad regulatory require-
ment might ease in-court proof of the adequacy of labeling as compared with
proof under the self-determined manufacturer and customer systems of ad-
ministering individualized training programs.8 9
Compliance with a performance orientation standard enhances the prepa-
ration of a defendant's claim that the government standard had been met.
OSHA is more particular about some aspects of performance; for example, it
requires chemical labeling and material safety data sheets to identify target
organs that a chemical may harm.9° OSHA issued a standard data sheet
format as a model, but individualized sheets remain adequate if they supply
at least the minimum safety data required by OSHA. 9 More sophisticated
manufacturing firms will have more elaborate data sheets available, but the
performance standard does not command uniformity in the OSHA regula-
tion.92 Each nonexempt employer may develop its own sheets or rely on the
original manufacturing company's sheet. If an employer fails to meet the
requirements of the hazard communication standard, OSHA may impose a
civil penalty and demand corrective action within a reasonable abatement
88. OSHA intended this standard to be "stated largely in performance language," accord-
ing to the preamble to the final standard. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,321 (1983); see also Auchter, 763
F.2d at 728.
89. The performance orientation "will require more interpretation from employers and
compliance officers" because of a "lack of understanding of the broad scope of the standard,"
according to the deputy director of field operations for OSHA. Minter, OSHA 's 1986 Agenda,
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Dec. 1985, at 61-63. The field instructions for OSHA inspections
became more important as the agency moved to the performance approach. See, e.g., H.C.
Standard Enforcement Added to Field Operations Manual. RIGHT-TO-KNow NEWS, Nov. 1,
1986, at 5. However, the field inspector and administrative judge have greater difficulty pro-
ducing consistent results with such a rule than with an explicit command. See O'Reilly, The
Impact of Performance-Oriented Rules on Administrative Enforcement.: The Case of OSHA
Hazard Communication Rules, 2 LAB. LAW. 695, 722 (1986).
90. Target organs are parts of the body to which a specific chemical apparently migrates
after it is ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin. OSHA expects manufacturers to list
the organ on the data sheet and label so that the worker will pay more attention to the warning
than to a mere "do not inhale" statement. See 52 Fed. Reg. 31,864 (1987).
91. OSHA chose not to make its form mandatory, and, indeed, it recognized the appropri-
ateness in some plants of an alternative to the material safety data sheet, such as a written
manual. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,337 (1983).
92. Indeed, even regulators have difficulty adapting to a flexible approach. An attitude
adjustment problem may exist in the field inspection process. Government inspectors familiar
with more rigid precision in regulation, and hearing officers who review their penalty citation
charges, need to be reoriented to allow varieties of performance under the same standard with-
out faulting the employers who meet the standard in creative new ways. See O'Reilly, supra
note 89. at 707.
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period.93 A posted federal notice alerts workers that OSHA has issued a
charge of violation.
94
The hazard communication standard has produced tremendous expansion
in workplace safety communications, with emphasis on acquisition of safety
data and training of workers. Due to the regulation's economic incentive for
employers to "tell all" about hazardous chemicals and to create training
records of specific workers for specific chemicals during specific time peri-
ods, seminars, films, educational materials, and other means of compliance
have increased dramatically.95 Participation in such activities strengthens
the tort defense of chemical manufacturers.
The communication benefit of the hazard communication standard favor-
ably compares with state worker "right-to-know" legislation because states
frequently have insufficient funds to enforce their laws.96 Apart from the
State of New York, the most publicity-conscious enforcer of chemical disclo-
sure law, states have not aggressively enforced their requirements for risk
communication. 97 By effectively preempting state and local workplace label-
ing laws, 98 the OSHA hazard communication standard has delivered a more
effective enforcement mechanism for assuring uniform workplace communi-
cations from coast to coast.
Early litigation regarding OSHA's hazard communication standard chal-
lenged its adoption and preemptive effects. However, the courts have upheld
OSHA's legal authority to enact the standard and have affirmed most of the
93. 29 U.S.C. § 658. The functions of charging and determining liability are separate;
OSHA cites the employer for violation and the independent Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission adjudicates the charges. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659, 661. See generally Johnson,
The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions From the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39
ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987).
94. The Bhopal, India disaster in 1984 has emphasized the need for visibility of enforce-
ment and in-depth inspection of chemical facilities. OSHA, SYSTEMS SAFETY EVALUATIONS
OF OPERATIONS WITH CATASTROPHIC POTENTIAL, CPL 2-2 (1987). OSHA has imposed
large fines on violators of the hazard communications and recordkeeping rules, such as the
$480,840 proposed penalty for a Connecticut fabric coating company. See OSHA Fines
Uretek, Inc., RIGHT-TO-KNow NEWS, Aug. 15, 1987, at 9.
95. OSHA requires recordkeeping regarding employee training as part of the written haz-
ard communication program. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e), (h) (1987). However, the standard
does not literally require that the employer record which employee received training at which
time.
96. Funding of such laws is usually part of the appropriations for the state labor depart-
ment. In states that adopted their own OSHA plans, as permitted by 29 U.S.C. § 667(b), the
state must fund its own safety communication program.
97. See New York Enforces R-T-K for Office Workers, RIGHT-TO-KNow NEWS, Jan. 15,
1987, at 6 (when office workers complained of exposure to methylene chloride, hexane, and
trichloroethane, employer paid $5,000 in fines and was forced to give training courses and
instructions).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (1987).
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provisions of the standard while clarifying the trade secret definition and
ordering expansion of the types of employers covered.9 9 OSHA added hos-
pitals, transportation, warehousing, and retail sectors of the economy to the
mandatory category of employers required to train workers about caution-
ary labels, the need for protection, and potential harms of exposure to
cheiicals. "
The hazard communication standard has the potential to bring the least
sophisticated firms up to a reasonable level of safety communication and to
improve the safety labeling practices of even the most cautious firms.' °'
While it may be 1989 before the OSHA inspectional process reaches the
smallest regulated firms to compel compliance, the enforcement process be-
gan with such vigor and publicity that the standard is generally regarded as
a success. '
0 2
Violations charged by OSHA inspectors may lead to a proposed civil pen-
alty case. The independent Occupational Safety & Health Review Commis-
sion (the Commission), whose decisions eventually reach the federal
appellate courts, may settle or adjudicate such cases.'o 3 Early enforcement
decisions by the Commission suggest that the standard receives strong en-
forcement support through the penalty hearings process.'0 4 Apparently,
even in cases where the manufacturer did not anticipate the activities of the
99. See Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130, 140-42 (3d Cir.
1986) (sections of Pennsylvania statute preempted by OSHA Act), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W.
3242 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 86-1102); Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 831-
34 (6th Cir. 1986) (city ordinance preempted by OSHA Act), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3240
(U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 86-1242); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774
F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1985) (sections of New Jersey statute preempted by OSHA Act); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 739-42 (3d Cir. 1985) (clarifying definition of
trade secret).
100. Addition of other categories of employees covered by the standard, into the standard
industrial classification categories, was delayed pending reconsideration. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852
(1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987)).
101. While it is too soon after adoption to have empirical evidence, it is generally believed
that enforcement of a minimum standard of safety-related communications against small firms
will motivate all other firms to improve their practices.
102. Enforcement of the standard is discussed in O'Reilly, supra note 89, at 728.
103. Section 661 of the OSHA Act established the Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 661, and re-
view of its adjudicatory final orders is available in the federal courts of appeals, 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(a)-(b). The independence of the enforcement adjudication process has both positive and
negative effects. See Johnson, supra note 93, at 347; O'Reilly, supra note 89, at 729.
104. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 14 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) (13
O.S.H. Cas.) 1182 (Apr. 2, 1987) (Burroughs, ALJ) (first significant enforcement decision up-
holding "target organ" label requirements); see also Failure to Label Complete Data Sheets
Results in Majority of 156 OSHA Citations, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at A-3 (Mar. 28,
1986) (if OSHA could "link the lack of a label on a chemical drum to an injury, the employer
could receive a serious citation").
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downstream customer-employer, ambiguities in the performance standard
are being resolved in favor of expanded risk communications. 0 5 OSHA in-
spectors actively police the communication chain between label design, em-
ployee training, and worker use.'o 6 It can be predicted that enforcement will
compel the use of comprehensive workplace warnings, which workers will
understand and follow.
C. SARA Reinforcement of Hazard Communications
By the end of 1988, new reporting requirements pertaining to industrial
chemical risks will become operative. The "community right to know" pro-
visions of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) °7 go into effect in four phases. Each phase will increase the ability
of persons outside the factory, as well as workers inside, to learn about po-
tential chronic illness risks posed by the chemical facility." 8 SARA requires
factories that handle in excess of a certain quantity of chemicals to report to
local and state officials: (1) the presence of any of the several hundred chem-
icals designated to be extremely hazardous;'0 9 (2) detailed figures relating to
the release, spill, or emission of any of several hundred toxic chemicals;" 0
(3) an inventory of location, quantity, and conditions of use of any OSHA-
regulated chemical subject to the hazard communication standard;"' and
(4) material safety data sheets for all of these "OSHA-hazardous"
chemicals. 1
2
By mid-1988, a resident of the community, a worker, or a prospective
applicant for a job will be able to review detailed chemical data to reach
independent conclusions about the safety of working at or living near a fac-
tory. The local fire department, the local emergency response committee
105. Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 14 O.S.H. Rep. (13 O.S.H. Cas.) at 1182, involved an OSHA
charge that the manufacturer had a duty to anticipate and warn against misuse. The manufac-
turer's label reflected its recommended use of the chemical, but the administrative law judge
ruled that labels also should consider other possible uses. Id. at 1195-96.
106. See O'Reilly, supra note 89, at 725.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11049 (Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter SARA].
108. The first phase of reporting under SARA is to identify, for state governments, every
facility in which an extremely hazardous chemical is present. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2836 (1987) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 370) (proposed Jan. 27, 1987). Next, EPA makes public material
safety data sheets for chemicals present at a level above a threshold, which EPA has set at
10,000 pounds. Id. Inventories of "hazardous' "chemicals must be reported in March of 1988
and successive years. Id. The final stage is a complex, annual report of discharges of hazard-
ous materials into the environment from a facility under § 313 of SARA. 52 Fed. Reg. 21,152
(1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372) (proposed June 4, 1987).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 11023.
110. Id. § 11004.
111. Id. § 11022.
112. Id. § 11021.
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(usually an arm of civil defense), and the state government will make sets of
documents available."1 3 A site-specific computer data base, maintained by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will contain portions of this
reported data."' These new sources of data will provide workers and the
public with previously unavailable safety information." ' Due to the availa-
bility of this information, public sector officials and private persons can
make much more accurate decisions regarding plant safety.
From a tort liability perspective, the SARA information is a road map to
the fulfillment of a tort plaintiff's burden of proof. As an example, a worker-
plaintiff, employed in three different chemical facilities for ten-year intervals
at each plant, who knows the trade names of the primary chemicals used at
each of those sites will be able to check the adverse health effect warnings for
each of those chemicals. A worker-plaintiff with liver cancer will be able to
check the cancer warnings on a chemical that the worker used without
gloves over ten years ago." t 6 Plant emissions and disposal figures will permit
a worker-plaintiff to attempt to learn more about the particular types of oc-
cupational exposures that may have caused ill effects that would give rise to
a cause of action." 7 If the worker hauled trash or made contract repairs, he
or she may be able to use SARA data as the primary source of information
about exposures alleged to have caused his or her illness." 8 At a minimum,
113. These are available to the public at each of the reporting locations to which that plant
is required to send its reporting forms. Id. § 11044(a).
114. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a statutory duty to automate this
data for public access. Id. § 11231 (Supp. IV 1987).
115. No alternative public source was available for this data prior to the adoption of the
1986 legislation, though portions could have been compiled from industry data by soliciting
material safety data sheets from "downstream" customers pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200(f)(2) (1987), or perhaps by using other local sources of information. Access to
detailed process or ingredient information by workers during training under the hazard com-
munication standard, id. § 1910.1200(h)(1)(ii), did not automatically make the information
public because many workers have express or implied confidentiality obligations.
116. Although evidentiary rules generally prohibit the admission of post-accident redesign
to show defectiveness as of the time of the accident, FED. R. EVID. 407, a defense asserting
lack of feasibility could open the way for such evidence. See Jacobson v. Manfredi, 100 Nev.
226, 231, 679 P.2d 251, 254 (1984). Alternatively, a plaintiff might argue that remedial meas-
ures, such as warnings, were implemented before the cause of action accrued. Typically, can-
cer may have a long latency period so knowledge of the cancer might come after the warning.
This will be a novel debate when the proper case occurs.
117. The data available to the public as a result of SARA "discharge" reporting under 42
U.S.C. § 11023 will be useful to an injured worker or former employee whose illness was
caused by one of the "toxic" chemicals to which such release reports relate. A plaintiff can
obtain more specific data about volumes of releases from the plant and can tie such informa-
tion into the in-plant location data to estimate exposure histories. See Id. § 11022.
118. These workers are on the site but are not eligible for the same qualitative treatment as
employees. They have rights under the hazard communication standard from their respective
employers. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987). However, because these workers operate on a cas-
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SARA delivers to the chronically ill worker-plaintiff information with which
he or she may build a more complete causal connection between exposure
and illness, thereby providing a foundation for further analysis by his or her
medical experts. 119
Requiring each local committee to advertise the availability of the public
data file once per year assures workers awareness of the availability of
SARA safety information. 2 ' Public access to mandatory "hazard analysis"
documents probably will result in news reports by the local media on the
findings of hazard analyses of facilities in the community. Furthermore,
groups such as the League of Women Voters and the Sierra Club will, in all
likelihood, make extensive efforts to educate residents about the data.121
D. The EPA Reinforcement of Hazard Communications
In addition to the SARA and OSHA provisions, the EPA has begun de-
velopment of a hazard communications program for workers who are ex-
posed to certain "new" chemicals not previously marketed in this country.
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 12 2 authorizes the EPA to place
limitations on a worker's exposure to certain chemicals. 23 The EPA will
select the categories from which chemicals will be regulated under TSCA
from categories that will include chemicals not previously commercialized' 
24
and chemicals required to undergo EPA's new chemical screening pro-
cess.125 As a result of the chemical screening process, the EPA will have the
ual, contract, or noncontract service basis and have little awareness of the risks about which
regular employees are warned, they may be more susceptible to harmful exposure situations.
OSHA's expansion of the definition of the word "employer" to include contractors and sub-
contractors will increase information flow to these workers. Revision of Hazard Communica-
tions Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,864 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917,
1918, 1926, 1928) (1987).
119. The data provides the plaintiff's medical expert with a biased source, for the expert
will never see reports coming from the tobacco smoke, food, or beverages that the plaintiff may
have ingested or from any other ingested or inhaled sources of carcinogens. The selectivity of
the sources in these reports distorts the overall causative perspective. See L. Novey, supra note
5, at 135 (smoking distorts some occupational epidemiology studies).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 11044(b).
121. The individual's cumulative knowledge of the risk from all sources, not only employer
or manufacturer warnings, is admissible to show assumption of the risk of misuse. See, e.g.,
American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 799 F.2d 993, 995 (5th
Cir. 1986).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982) [hereinafter TSCA].
123. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1)-(3), authorizes control of existing chemicals and 15 U.S.C.
§ 2504, authorizes control of "new" chemicals not previously in commerce.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 provides the criteria for determining whether a chemical is to be
considered "new", and the requirements for complying with the EPA Administrator's rules for
the manufacture and use of a new chemical. Id.
125. 40 C.F.R. pt. 720 (1987), discusses the new chemical review process.
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power to impose a warning requirement on the use of the screened chemical
to limit potentially unsafe worker exposure.' 26 The warning requirement
could include EPA-mandated labeling, material safety data sheets, and em-
ployee training. 2 7 Manufacturers could be required to label new chemicals
before they reach the workplace.' 8 The EPA views these measures as nec-
essary to limit the risks from new chemicals, the effects of which are not yet
fully understood.
129
The EPA program and the OSHA hazard communication standard fur-
ther the same goal of worker risk notification. 3 0 However, because the EPA
program is prospective and deals with new chemicals only, it will have a
slight effect, if any, on current products liability exposure.
III. DIFFICULTIES IN ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE NEW FEDERAL
SYSTEM IN TORT CASES
Employers are responsible for the collection and assembly of safety data,
as well as the effective education of workers under the OSHA, SARA, and
EPA systems. The inability of some employers to collect, process, and inter-
pret safety data inherently weakens the quality of communication and hin-
ders efforts to assess the effectiveness of these worker-protection programs.
Two difficulties exist in weighing the impact of federal regulation upon
tort exposure. Both relate to conditions at the workplace of the particular
employer. The first problem stems from lack of employer sophistication: a
function of an employer's awareness of new rules, awareness of toxic chemi-
cals, ability to process incoming paperwork from suppliers about these
chemicals, and ability to foresee a risk situation. The proper response to this
problem is for manufacturers to promote voluntary education of employees
and users.
The second problem involves the strength of disincentives where the small
plant with the lowest cost-of-production wins contracts, but also declines to
pay for the engineering controls needed to alleviate a potential risk situation
126. Id.
127. 40 C.F.R. §§ 722.70-722.75 (1987).
128. Id. The regulations would require labeling of mixtures containing a "new" chemical
before its introduction into the workplace.
129. The TSCA program is analogous to the clearance procedure conducted for a new
drug. The Food and Drug Administration restricts uses of and requires cautions on a drug
until experience with the drug is developed. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (new drug applications); 21
C.F.R. pt. 314 (1987) (procedures for new drug approval).
130. The former head of OSHA has noted that the programs of the two agencies are mov-
ing towards one another with respect to the reviewing of hazardous chemical substances. Ty-
son, OSHA, EPA Responsibilities Merge as Agencies Develop Similar Interests, 56
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 84 (1987).
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posed by the presence of a toxic chemical. Because workers' compensation
generally shields employers from the tort system's deterrence potential, 131
regulation poses a much more tangible threat to force employers into com-
pliance with the law and to stimulate education of workers. Regulatory fines
are not covered by insurance, 132 and they generate bad publicity.' 33 Fur-
thermore, although the recent past has seen virtually no criminal enforce-
ment,' 34  OSHA violations carry potential criminal penalties.' 3 '
Enforcement of all available sanctions to force the noncomplying employer
to meet the same safety prerequisites to operation as competitors must meet
should compensate for disincentives to compliance. 1
36
States that previously have enacted their own worker right-to-know legis-
lation will enjoy reductions of tort liability more rapidly than states without
a similar incentive toward compliance.' 37 Regulation has substituted for
tort deterrence longer in these states than in others. While the federal sys-
tem overshadows the state legislative role of worker right-to-know enforce-
ment, 138 state efforts deserve praise for addressing the two issues of
sophistication and incentives. The background of state regulation has moti-
vated compliance by smaller employers and has raised the level of employer
consciousness about chemical exposures. State laws and their advocacy by
131. See supra note 3.
132. Insurance for casualty losses typically requires an unanticipated "event," while regu-
latory fines apply to a pattern of misconduct. Additionally, it may be against public policy to
allow the compensation of persons for violations resulting in penalties.
133. Extensive publicity concerning OSHA fines has been used to deter violations of injury
recordkeeping requirements, such as $2,600,000 against 113P Inc., see OSHA Cracking Down,
RIGHT-TO-KNOw NEWS, Aug. 15, 1987, at 9, and $1,380,000 against Union Carbide, see
Rich, OSHA Has "Got to Nail Somebody," CHEMICAL WEEK, Apr. 9, 1986, at 11. The com-
bined use of publicity and OSHA as a vehicle of union leverage during a strike is taking on new
importance where safety violations are alleged, as it did in a 1987 Connecticut strike in which
$480,840 in federal penalties for hazard communication violations were proposed by OSHA.
See OSHA Fines Uretek Inc., RIGHT-TO-KNow NEWS, Aug. 15, 1987, at 9; Ravo, Chemical
Fumes Set OffPlant Strike, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at 14, col. 1.
134. A report from the National Safe Workplace Institute in Chicago Illinois challenged
lax enforcement of OSHA criminal remedies. See generally J. KINNEY, SAFETY AT BAY-
THE FAILURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY LAWS (1987).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e). It has been argued that these provisions preempt state criminal
prosecution for workplace deaths. Kendall, Criminal Prosecution: At Odds with the OSH Act?,
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Oct. 1986, at 60.
136. Economists have found that workers will demand a "risk premium" of higher pay if
told the actual risks to which the job exposes them. W. VISCUsI & W. MAGAT, supra note 34,
at 119. Enforcement of the OSHA standard across all competing domestic manufacturers
would presumably equalize the risk-related aspect of wages.
137. State right-to-know laws exist in about 32 states apart from the federal requirements.
52 Fed. Reg. 31,857 (1987).
138. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 736 (3d Cir. 1985).
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unions has raised the expectations of workers as well. '13 9
Further empirical work will undoubtedly be done throughout the 1990's
to measure the effect the federal system has on the incidence of tort liability
actions involving industrial chemicals. While injurious exposures will un-
doubtedly decrease because of increased awareness and detection of safety
problems, the incidence of tort suits against chemical products suppliers may
increase because of increased worker awareness of potential occupational
causes of chronic illnesses.
IV. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATION UPON THE ASSUMPTION
OF RISK DEFENSE
As discussed in Section I, 4° traditional tort law discounted the assump-
tion of risk defense because workers in occupational settings had little oppor-
tunity to understand and no opportunity to change hazardous conditions of
machinery, ladder, or building use.' 4 ' Increased federal involvement in dis-
semination of worker safety information presages a shift of balance; the same
139. A union has a moral obligation to its members to promote safe working conditions.
Principal support for the adoption of state right-to-know laws came from union efforts in state
legislatures. See O'Reilly, Driving a Soft Bargain: Unions, Toxic Materials, and Right to Know
Legislation, 9 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 318 (1985). Unions presumably will actively use
their express rights under the OSHA hazard communication standard. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200(i) (1987) (enabling unions to have access to trade secrets unavailable to other
organizations).
Unions are likely to escape tort liability to injured employees as a result of the United States
Supreme Court's 1987 decision in IBEW v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987). In Hechler, the
Court held that the employer, "not a labor union ...owes employees a duty to exercise
reasonable care in providing a safe workplace." Id. at 2167. The question whether the union
had adopted such a nonstatutory duty by contract was deferred to labor law remedies, such as
arbitration, rather than to tort remedies. Id. at 2168-69. Although a case can be made that the
union has an independent duty to communicate information to its members based upon infor-
mation the union has received, the union will probably not codefend in worker tort actions as a
result of Hechler. See Union Had No Duty to Ensure Safety, Court Rules in Dismissing
Widow's Claim, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 191, at A-2 (Oct. 5, 1987). While the union's
contribution to the continued risk by silence about known risks could present a moral obliga-
tions issue, it probably would not become a compensable tort.
140. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
141. See Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652 (3d Cir. 1982);
Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 836, 454 P.2d 205, 208 (1969). An expert com-
mentator put this into perspective by noting that "[t]he War over assumption of risk sees some
of its fiercest battles in arguments about dangerous products in the workplace." M. SHAPO,
supra note 3, at 20-20 (citing Green v. Edmands Co., 639 F.2d 286, 290 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Chemical exposure case law allows the defense of assumption of risk where a worker knew of
discussions concerning a risk and, without instruction to do so, directly exposed himself to that
chemical. See Oatis v. Catalytic Inc., 433 So. 2d 328, 333 (La. App.), cert. denied, 441 So. 2d
215 (La. Sup. Ct. 1983).
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dissemination of risk information that spurred workers' tort claims will re-
store viability to the assumption of risk defense.
A. The End of Uninformed Workers?
The federal system described in Section II I42 creates a massive, docu-
mented system of mandatory training of individual workers about workplace
chemical risks. Employers will deliver to workers information specific to the
chemical product exposures experienced in the workplace. Risks will be
communicated about the products, even where specific components may re-
main trade secrets. 143 Secrets will no longer exist about products posing the
potential for serious illness from chronic exposure. Employees will be in-
formed at the workplace of special safety precautions recommended or re-
quired for work with certain chemicals. 1" Obviously, the result will be a
greater onus on the worker not to disregard safety precautions.
B. Validating the Employer's Compliance with Its Duty to Warn
Adequate safety communications reduce the liability of both manufactur-
ers and employers. The external validation by federal inspectors of the haz-
ard warning messages provided by the manufacturers' product labeling and
data sheets will benefit indirectly manufacturers facing tort suits. Further-
more, OSHA instructs inspectors to ensure that employers provide adequate
warning information.' 45 OSHA measures the warnings provided by the
manufacturer and delivered by the employer against the warning informa-
tion that the federal agency considers to be adequate for that plant and those
workers.' 4 6 OSHA acts as an auditor of the manufacturer through its in-
spections of employers.
Performance flexibility in standards aids both the manufacturer and the
employer.' 47 The manufacturer uses flexibility to select from several possi-
ble approaches such as brochures, package labels, or material safety data
sheets. The manufacturer also has a choice of data formats. The customer-
142. See supra notes 62-130 and accompanying text.
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(h)(2), (iv), (i) (1987).
144. Id. § 1910.1200(h). OSHA requires training for new and reassigned employees. Field
inspectors have been told to interview employees to determine if they actually received the
information and were able to utilize that data. OFFICE OF HEALTH COMPLIANCE ASSIST-
ANCE, OSHA, INSPECTION PROCEDURES FOR THE HAZARD COMMUNICATION STANDARD,
CPL 2-2.38A, at 23-26 (1986) [hereinafter OFFICE OF HEALTH COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE].
145. OFFICE OF HEALTH COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, supra note 144, at 23-26.
146. OSHA measures the performance of the label against the quality that its industrial
hygiene evaluators would expect. For OSHA's evaluation procedure, see id. at 11-16.
147. See generally supra note 88 and accompanying text. However, flexibility may carry
the burden of unpredictable defense from liability. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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employer retains flexibility to utilize the information provided by the manu-
facturer in a different format when the employer trains its workers.
In a future tort suit, it will be more difficult for a worker-plaintiff to argue
the inadequacy of some federal norm of training to meet a tort defendant's
duty to warn. Instead, the defendant will argue that, under the performance
standard, a federal official reviewed and accepted without challenge its spe-
cific choice of training content and warning methods. 4 8 In effect, the de-
fense can rely on a federal stamp of approval to establish the adequacy of its
warnings.
C. The Mutual Need to Comply
The task of complying with the OSHA hazard communication standard
requires the joint efforts of employees, unions, employers, and manufacturers
who control warning content. The standard assumes active participation of
all these parties; ignorance by any one of them reduces the likelihood that all
will benefit from safety efforts in the workplace.
The novel aspect of the hazard communication process is the transfer to
workers of some of the employer's chemical information, and, with it, some
of the employer's prior, exclusive control over information. More dissemi-
nation of risk information and mandatory worker training in hazard com-
munication will occur. As a result, new information about risks will likely
be spread within the plant and beyond its gates to local residents. Individual
training and more extensive data sharing may lead to aggressive worker in-
volvement in decisions regarding safe work practices. As a consequence of
this action, however, the worker assumes some of the risks if he or she con-
sciously chooses to violate known safeguards and an injury occurs.149
148. The hazard communication compliance is a standard subject of the field inspection at
a facility. OFFICE OF HEALTH COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, supra note 144, at 8-10. If the
OSHA inspector reviewed the plan and chose not to cite the employer for a violation, that
probably would be admissible as some evidence of approval. If the inspector found a violation
and the administrative law judge later ruled that the firm was in compliance, the firm in a tort
action could offer the adjudicative decision as an authoritative conclusion of adequate
communication.
149. The worker cannot assert that the federal standard should be used as the measure of
adequate training for periods before the 1986 effective date. OSHA concluded that a "critical
need" for this mandatory standard existed because it was industry custom not to communi-
cate. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,282 (1983). Thus, industry custom, in the absence of more specific
proof, must be presumed to be noncommunication prior to the 1986 effective date of the stan-
dard. Adoption of the subsequent remedial standard contradicts any assertion that full com-
munication was the industry's practice prior to the federal standard. As to employee
assumptions prior to the standard, see Oatis v. Catalytic Inc., 433 So. 2d 328, 333 (La. App.),
cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 215 (La. Sup. Ct. 1983) and Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict
Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 875-77 (1982).
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Insurance carriers' risk management inspections often stimulate employ-
ers to comply with warning requirements. Insurance agents insist on
tougher work rules at the work site to reduce liability exposures. The pru-
dent employer will actually read and file the incoming safety data sheets and
other data to comply with the new federal regulations. The new knowledge
imposes a more precise duty to control risks. Previously, an employer would
be held to the level of knowledge of an expert in the particular manufactur-
ing field. Now, the employer who assigns workers to handle particular
chemicals has the more precise duty to comply with safeguards prescribed in
the manufacturer's material safety data sheet or label.' 5 °
If the employer decides to suppress the manufacturer's safeguard informa-
tion rather than install engineering controls or provide protective equipment
called for in the manufacturer's hazard information, that conscious decision
will carry the potential for increased liability exposures. For example, a
chemical may be so powerful that its manufacturer will direct employers to
enclose totally the chemical processing system in pipes or vessels that pre-
vent vapors from escaping. A small employer, however, may find a rede-
signed plant with totally enclosed piping prohibitively expensive.
Alternatively, the employer could choose to use a less hazardous material,
could invent a safer process of handling, or could choose to expose the work-
ers to the chemical notwithstanding the manufacturer's instructions for safe
use.' 5 ' If an employer chooses the latter action and an injury occurs, the
employer may face liability under intentional tort theories, which in some
states may impose tort liability over and above workers' compensation cov-
erage.' 5 2 A worker-plaintiff in such a case would seek heavier damage
awards with arguments of egregious violations. 153
The hazard communication standard's "performance" orientation allows
150. Employers are free to vary from manufacturers' material safety data sheets, "but if
[employees] do so, [they] would then assume responsibility for the adequacy and accuracy of
the information they use." OSHA, Hazard Communication Standard preamble, 48 Fed. Reg.
53,280, 53,306 (1983).
151. Divergence from a manufacturer's label warnings subjects the person making the di-
vergence to some increased exposure to liability in actions brought by injured third parties in
the drug field. Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient Informa-
tion, 30 ST. Louis L.J. 633, 670-71 (1986); Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human
Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
693, 749 (1978). A similar phenomenon may develop in future chemicals injury cases.
152. State law prohibitions against tort recovery contained in workers' compensation laws
often have an intentional torts exception, but the exception is difficult to satisfy. See M.
SHAPO, supra note 3, at 15-2; see also Jones v. VIP Development Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 97,
472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (1984) (defendant chemical user told workers that acid fumes were not
a hazard; plaintiff argued affirmative misrepresentaton of risks of exposure).
153. The foreseeability of an event reduces the ability of the defendant to assert that such
an event excused its negligent act.
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the employer to select communication and control measures appropriate for
particular use conditions. Specific chemical regulatory standards that pre-
scribe defined limits restrict this flexibility. The employer's failure to meet
the chemical handling conditions shown on the manufacturer's instructions
do not impose automatic penalties, but OSHA inspectors probably would
require the employer to document and justify the alternative method of
worker safeguards selected. If a tort suit arose, the employer would face the
additional risk of a manufacturer-defendant's cross-claim that the negligent
action or omission of the employer superceded the product manufacturer's
liability. 114
V. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY PERSPECTIVES
Work by several economics and behavioral science scholars suggests that
increasing the quality of workplace communications will improve safety.
Through their examination of worker and consumer responses to sample la-
beling, Viscusi and Magat demonstrated that providing risk information
changes actions.' 55 Individuals who get adequate risk information demand
higher pay for work that poses greater risk or select a different level of pre-
cautionary behavior. In a 1987 book, Viscusi and Magat articulated that
adequate information stimulates the individual recipients' preferences to
avoid injury, encouraging safer behavior.' 5 6 However, the information must
be convincing to change behavior: "Information policies should be designed
both to convey accurately the best objective estimates of product risks and to
convince users of the accuracy of those estimates."' 5 7
An earlier paper by Schwartz and Driver studied workplace use of cau-
tionary information. 5 s Deficient workplace data did not provide adequate
warning and posed liability problems.' 5 9 Labels must be understandable by
workers. 160 Products liability consequences of this inadequate warning were
explored and suggestions for improvement in labeling and communications
154. Industrial injury cases involving machinery frequently involve such cross-claims. M.
SHAPO, supra note 3, at 14-32. An employer who fails to communicate risk may receive all the
liability in an action originally begun solely against the manufacturer. See, e.g., Goodbar v.
Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 559 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Beale v. Hardy, 769
F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985).
155. See generally W. ViscusI & W. MAGAT, supra note 34.
156. Id. at 128.
157. Id. at 126.
158. Schwartz & Driver, Warnings in the Work Place: The Need for a Synthesis of Law and
Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38 (1983).
159. Id. at 43-45.
160. Id. at 58-59.
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methods were made. 1
6 1
Dr. Charles O'Connor, former head of labeling for a large chemical firm
and author of a book on chemical warnings, has studied workers' responses
to data about chemical exposure risks. In a 1987 study of worker behavior,
Drs. O'Connor and Viscusi concluded that workers quit jobs where risks
make employment "sufficiently unattractive."' 62 O'Connor and Viscusi also
studied data on responses by workers to chemical safety data.163 Their pa-
per concluded that the better the informational content of the safety data
communicated to the workers, the more influence the hazard warning would
have upon worker behavior. 1
64
These economic examinations of risk communication aid the manufac-
turer in its argument that after imposition of a regulatory requirement of
training and labeling, and after employers come into compliance with that
requirement, the courts should presume that worker conduct will change to
avoid risks-to the point that nonconformity with a label will be deemed an
assumption of risk.'65 It is impossible to measure the probability that a
given accident will occur at a chemical plant. Warnings reduce the potential
for accidents, but they cannot eliminate human errors. Economic studies
suggest that an adverse effect from exposure will be more likely to be
avoided if more attention to safety devices and more self-protective caution
is stimulated. There is proof that these factors are stimulated if the worker
gets the kind of information which the OSHA and SARA systems
provide. 1
66
Economic arguments justifying strict products liability, a policy widely
debated in recent scholarship, suggest that manufacturers' strict liability
spreads product injury losses across many customers.' 67 By analogy, federal
safety regulation can spread the costs of OSHA labeling and data sheet prep-
161. Id. at 67-72.
162. Viscusi, Hazard Warnings for Workplace Risks, in W. Viscusi & W. MAGAT, supra
note 34, at 99.
163. W. VIscusI & W. MAGAT, supra note 34, at 61.
164. Id. at 99.
165. There is already a presumption that if label warnings were given, they would have
been heeded by the injured person. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 388(a), 402A comment j
(1965). The manufacturer can also expect the employer to pass along the warnings so that the
worker understands them. Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453, 1457 (6th Cir.
1984); Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 559 (W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985).
166. See Viscusi, Hazard Warnings for Workplace Risks, in W. VISCUSI & W. MAGAT,
supra note 34, at 99.
167. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1273 (8th Cir. 1972),
M. SHAPO, supra note 3, at 7-23 to 7-24; Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of
Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 542 (1985).
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aration across hundreds of purchasers.' 68 However, in the industrial setting,
once the manufacturer-vendor pays the regulatory cost-of-communication, it
should not also bear strict liability when one of its customers, an employer,
fails to communicate adequately with its workers.
Courts should employ the existing presumption that a warning label, if
used, would have been heeded.' 69 Moreover, the law should presume that
industrial product warnings flowing downstream from manufacturers to in-
dustrial customers will actually get to the workers who need them. The
manufacturer who complied with OSHA should be accorded a "reward" of
presumptions that adequate warning did occur. Conversely, the intervening
lack of compliance by an employer should be rebuttably presumed to have
affected the worker's ability to protect against harm from the chemical
product.
The allocation of costs makes the picutre more complex. The Viscusi
study suggests that the cost of keeping workers at a job will increase as the
workers gain more information about the risks of that job.'7 ° Wage cost
increases will be borne by the employer, as will lost production time spent on
mandatory safety training. Disability or workers' compensation systems
currently bear the largest direct costs of a chemical exposure injury. Em-
ployers shoulder these costs in addition to the indirect costs of temporary
replacements; retraining, or reassignment after an injured worker's rehabili-
tation; and incidental costs caused by illness of missing workers. The con-
sumer subsidizes these costs in higher prices for the manufactured item.
Mandatory hazard labeling and training forecloses an employer's eco-
nomic option of silence. The OSHA standard requires active, federally
monitored performance."7 ' Theentity that chooses how to implement this
performance standard is the employer. Avoidance of the consequential costs
of injury, as well as the regulatory costs of a violation, provides an incentive
to perform adequate training. The employer may have felt a disincentive to
warn, recognizing that workers will command higher wages for jobs with
newly recognized dangers, as Viscusi has observed.172 However, mandatory
risk communication circumvents the use of higher wage costs as a justifica-
tion for not communicating risks.
168. Costs of material safety data sheet preparation vary with the amount of professional
time and preproduction required. Cylinders for printing new labels and the initial label run
may cost $3000 depending on the volume of label and numbers of cylinders needed for the
printing test.
169. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 338(a), 402A comment j (1965).
170. W. ViSCUSI & W. MAGAT, supra note 34, at 129.
171. Active performance is required and cannot be avoided. Failure to act is a serious
violation of the standard.
172. W. VISCUSI & W. MAGAT, supra note 34, at 99.
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Worker safety training, therefore, delivers visible benefits such as reduc-
tion of illness-related loss. At the same time, regulation overrides the tradi-
tional rationale against worker information: the economic concern that
better risk communication would increase wage costs for more risky jobs.
The beneficial effects of increased safety communication on injury and illness
rates should justify the economic aspects of safety-related regulation.
173
As between tort litigation and administrative agency rulemaking, the reg-
ulatory option more economically delivers cautionary data to workers who
may need it. 174 Tort law would deter nonlabeling in some cases, but tort
deterence is episodic, unpredictable, and belated. Moreover, tort law cannot
deal with these economic benefits in broad, socially beneficial terms. The
tort suit recovers damages for individual workers and deters individual prod-
uct sellers, one at a time. Only regulatory controls can provide the "big
picture" of prospective control.
The current study of the tort law system by the American Law Institute,
which includes economic as well as legal assessments of the system, probably
will examine any correlations between societal benefits and tort law remedies
for a variety of products liability situations. 7 5 "This study, to be completed a
quarter-century after the landmark Restatement of Torts § 402A, t7 6 perhaps
will include an examination of liability considerations in the workplace haz-
ard communication setting.
VI. ANALYZING THE IDEAL INDUSTRIAL RISK COMMUNICATION
In the ideal system, workplace communications will operate so efficiently
that workers, employers, and unions cooperate in the safe handling of any
hazardous material that enters the workplace. Reduction in the number of
exposures to potential irritants and carcinogens will reduce time lost due to
illness and injury and will produce a more efficient workplace. Training
costs will be moderate, and new safety equipment costs may be moderate to
high. Moreover, new engineering controls will be expensive if they are fully
automated and enclosed to remove airborne exposures. The quality of the
communication will remain high, policed by frequent inspections and by
complaints received from workers and unions who review filings made under
SARA and OSHA.1
77
173. Future empirical studies will be needed to demonstrate this effect, but they are not
likely to occur soon.
174. The economic cost of learning about risk decreases more with prospective dissemina-
tion than with individual payments for disability and other benefits.
175. See ALI REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
176. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
177. See supra notes 84-121 and accompanying text.
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If this ideal situation transpires during the 1990's, will tort law's strict
liability for failure to warn have any continued societal rationale? When
identical conduct is systematically pursued and prosecuted without transac-
tion costs for the individual worker-plaintiff, tort law's deterrent role loses
its relevance. Society no longer needs the additional tort deterrence to sup-
plement the growing regulatory efforts to obtain a better informed and,
therefore, safer workplace. 1
78
VII. THE USE OF FEDERAL REGULATION IN THE TORT
CASE OF THE FUTURE
One can speculate that the future industrial products liability case will
differ in several ways from today's more traditional action. Today, advo-
cates most often challenge the inadequate preparation of a warning label
under strict liability failure to warn theories. 1 79 During discovery, parties
examine documents about the product planning team's awareness of the sce-
narios of injury.18 0 While the defendant's consultants testify that the label
met current state-of-the-art, the worker-plaintiff's consultants assert that the
label could have been better and hint that the plaintiff would have heeded a
more thorough label, thereby avoiding injury. The plaintiff's lawyer asserts
that the cost per label of revisions and improvements would be a tiny frac-
tion of the plaintiff's suffering.
The jury question of label adequacy might be unaffected today by external
considerations such as federal regulatory labeling rules. If that is the case,
then the wrong people are reviewing adequacy. Failure to consider compli-
ance with federal safety safeguards distorts the decisional process for the
jurors, just as an employer's denial of transmission of specific safety data
distorts the process of safety communications normally flowing from manu-
facturer to worker.1
8 1
178. This is particularly true as the reach and scope of control regulations expands into
virtually all workplaces. OSHA, Hazard Communication Expansion, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852
(1987). Arguably, a value of compensation for injuries remains uncovered by insurance pro-
grams such as workers' compensation. Even this purpose has diminished in importance due to
insurance availability. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
179. The strict liability action for failure to warn has the same characteristics and processes
as a negligence action. J. O'REILLY, supra note 14, § 6.3.
180. See generally T. KIELY, PREPARING PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES (1986) (examining
the records of product design to determine a basis for foreseeability); Allen, US. Companies
Pay Increasing Attention to Destroying Files, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1987, at I, col. I (describing
policies for record retention).
181. Refusing to pass along the data would be a violation of federal requirements, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f) (1987), and would at least be evidence of negligent conduct. See, e.g.,
Dougherty v. Santa Fe Marine Inc., 698 F.2d 232, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1983). Similarly, if the jury
attempted to identify unreasonably dangerous labels in a strict liability action, the law would
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In future tort litigation, manufacturer-defendants will seek to show that
OSHA had inspected the type of containers which the worker-plaintiff rou-
tinely handled and that their labels clearly warned of the risk of disease for
failure to follow safeguards. Depositions could establish the worker-plain-
tiff's disregard of the material safety data sheet, label, or other warnings.
Documents could show that the worker-plaintiff had attended numerous
training hours in safe handling of the chemical mixture and the availability
of monitoring data about the mixture. 82 Under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 18 3 manufacturer-defendants could obtain any OSHA industrial hy-
giene inspection reports. Typically, inspectors may have visited the plant in
response to anonymous complaints, but failed to take enforcement action. 84
Under these circumstances, the federal presence is likely to affect heavily
future tort cases. Worker-plaintiffs will have to weigh the costs that would
result from preparing a tort case for trial where the defendant can bring
together a strong indication of external endorsement of its label and a
stronger suggestion of assumption of the risk by the informed worker. De-
terring such cases will not leave the worker without remedy because work-
ers' compensation remains available.' 85 While compliance with OSHA
requirements does not guarantee avoidance of tort liability, the existence of
information-based protections, may cause acceptance of the assumption of
risk defense.' 8 6 The strict liability tort system redresses the evil of lack of
information. The availability of adequate communication, sufficient for soci-
ety and its microcosm, the jury, should justify denial of tort recovery.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Speculating about the persuasiveness of arguments to juries during the
measure unreasonableness as of the time the containers left the control of the manufacturer,
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A(a)(b) (1965), and it would be improper to disallow evidence
that the Restatement condition had been met by the supplier's compliance with the regulatory
standard.
182. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(h) (1987) requires training. OSHA instructs its employees to
look for evidence of the adequacy of the training. OFFICE OF HEALTH COMPLIANCE ASSIST-
ANCE, supra note 144, at 23-26. Monitoring data is required to be available to the workers
under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1987).
183. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
184. OSHA would sheild confidentiality in one of two ways. It would either not record the
identity of the caller, or it would withhold the caller's identity as law enforcement data, the
disclosure of which could invade the privacy of a private individual, or which would interfere
with OSHA investigations. See, e.g., Akron Standard Div. v. Donovan, 788 F.2d 1223, 1223
(6th Cir. 1986); Borton, Inc. v. OSHA, 566 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 (E.D. La. 1983); 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b).
185. See supra note 3.
186. OSHA compliance does not assure the absence of further tort duties to the persons
within the work area beyond the duty to deliver information concerning hazards.
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next decade is inherently risky. However, the changes in the assumption of
risk doctrine, and a major change in the foundation of strict liability for
failure to warn, merit consideration and further empirical research.
It is probable that defendants in industrial products liability actions dur-
ing the 1990's will have a far easier time asserting the assumption of risk
defense against worker-plaintiffs than current defendants have experienced.
The law of warnings, once driven by tort deterrence, now gets its momentum
from the more cost-efficient system of prospective regulation.
In the workplace of the future, optimal communication patterns will fea-
ture multiple routes for workers to gain information needed for self-protec-
tion. Even before joining a company, prospective applicants will have access
to chemical safety data in publicly accessible SARA files. Before manufac-
turers introduce new chemicals, EPA and OSHA requirements will assure
that workers have the tools to understand risks and precautions.
Knowledge is power; sharing power comes only with difficulty. However,
in the end, the industrial tort defendant will find that it has shared not only
power, but also self-protective obligations.
1987]

